The multiple case studies analysis developed through a content analysis applied to 13 business groups reveal whether and how the affiliation is influential on CSD. Findings show that the CSD of an entity is strongly affected by affiliation to a business group, both when subsidiaries operate in the same industry as their parent and when, notwithstanding the unrelated business, the directional activity of the parent is particularly significant.
Introduction
In recent years, the global financial crisis and the numerous corporate scandals have generated increasing attention to the impact of business on civil society as well as a growing demand for a better corporate governance system. Due to the collapse of many relevant corporations all around the world, the concept of corporate social responsibility (herein CSR) has continued to grow in importance and significance (Carroll and Shabana, 2010) stimulating the publication of several codes and regulations (Kolk, 2003) . In such a complex environment, many corporations reacted by adopting more stringent governance requirements (e.g., independent directors, self-discipline codes), developing sustainability reports and using other ethical instruments in order to communicate to the market that they are behaving in a responsible way.
Despite the fact that CSR has become a mainstream issue for researchers and practitioners, there is a paucity of empirical evidence on issues regarding the impacts of ownership structure on the corporate social disclosure (herein CSD)of listed companies. In particular, most literature investigates CSR by just focalising the attention on large listed companies (Campbell, 2007; Russo and Tencati, 2009 ), considered as independent entities.
However, in some European countries (such as Italy) listed companies are controlled and managed via a complex chain of holding companies (La Porta et al., 1999) .
In other words, listed affiliated-group companies are not always independent from each other. As revealed by Bianchi and Bianco (2006) , listed groups may include more than one listed company, underestimating the number of independent economic entities listed on the stock market. Therefore, the number of listed groups does not necessarily coincide with the number of listed companies.
For the Italian market, Di Carlo (2014) pointed out that by using a group structure, 10 families control 28 listed companies that represent 11.4% of non-financial listed firms. Moreover, analysing the management activity of the parent company over the controlled companies, the author found that some listed subsidiaries are independent whereas some others are not autonomous, being an integral part of a wider economic business entity.
Previous research in the field of CSD revealed that ownership types influence differently the level of sustainability disclosure, since not all the shareholders bring the same interests, objectives and decision-making horizons (Gibbins et al., 1990; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Khan et al., 2013) . Since decisions concerning social and environmental disclosure are affected by the choices, motives and values of those who are involved in formulating and taking strategies in the organisations, the consideration of ownership structure is an important determinant. Scholars that have analysed the CSD of listed companies and ownership have always considered listed firms as if they were independent economic entities, even if in most cases the affiliation of a listed company in a wider business group controlled by another listed company could explain the extent of the CSD.
The main contribution of this work relies on the analysis of the CSD of affiliated listed companies that share the same ownership and sometimes are not just controlled but also directed by the same parent company. To the best of our knowledge nobody has already investigated what happens when affiliated companies operate in related and unrelated sectors sharing the same ownership and governance.In those cases, both the engagement in CSR and the disclosure could be explained by the will of the listed controlling parent.
Therefore, the influence of corporate governance on CSD may be different and a closer analysis of the ownership characteristics on CSD is still lacking for some European countries (Allegrini and Greco, 2013) .
Thus this paper aims to provide new evidence on how the presence of a holding company and the ownership structure in business groups influence the CSD of affiliated listed firms. More specifically, this study seeks to give an answer to the following research questions:
Can the affiliation of listed companies in a wider business group influence their CSD? Do the affiliated listed companies have CSDs similar to each other and/or to their parent company? If the businesses of affiliated listed subsidiaries are unrelated, how much of their CSD can be explained by the industry in which they operate instead of their group affiliation?
In order to answer our research questions, an explanatory multiple case study analysis (Yin, 2003) of 22 listed subsidiaries and 13 parent companies is presented. These companies are all affiliated in different business groups since each of them has a controlling parent company listed on the stock exchange.
This research differs from the existing literature for several reasons and contributes to it in different ways. First, this study examines the relationship between ownership structure and CSD in business groups. Second, apart from the empirical investigation that prevails in most studies on CSR, we perform a multiple case studies analysis in order to deeply investigate the phenomenon.
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the relevant literature on business groups, CSD and organisational legitimacy, and proposes a theoretical framework from which our propositions are drawn. Section 3 describes the methodology and presents our findings. We conclude with a discussion for academics, practitioners and regulators, as well as acknowledging the limitations of our study and suggesting avenues for further research.
Theoretical framework
In this work we merge two streams of research; the first is on business groups, the second derives from the literature on CSD. Both have been analysed in the past but, to the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of literature specifically addressed to explain whether and why social and environmental disclosure may be influenced by the affiliation of a company in a wider business group.
Business groups as a single economic entity and non-financial information
Despite the fact that many scholars have documented the presence of business groups around the world (Claessens et al., 2006; La Porta et al., 1999; Morck, 2006) , business groups are a relatively underserved research topic (Boyd and Hoskisson, 2010) .
Research proposes different definitions for understanding what a business group is (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). Chang and Hong (2002) define it as a collection of formally independent firms under a single common administrative and financial control. Hsieh et al. (2010) consider a business group to be a collection of legally independent corporate entities that are established under the same control and ownership, each not only sustaining independent firm objectives, but also acting to meet the shared goals of the business group. Chung (2003) points out that although business groups exhibit slight differences in various contexts, they all forge institutionalised relationships with each other, not operating as isolated units in the market but working coherently as an entity.
The definitions given above are particularly useful for the purpose of this work, because, despite the presence of formally independent legal entities, they allow the consideration of a business group as a single economic entity.
Considering business groups as a single entity lets us understand the reduction or even the removal of important transaction costs among companies of the same group (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1985) . The reduction of these costs is one of the reasons for the establishment of business groups, especially in developing economies, where markets have a high degree of inefficiency (Claessens et al., 2006; Goto, 1982; Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Leff, 1978) .
The conception of a business group as a single economic entity is also widely accepted by the accounting literature. The reference is made to the accounting standards and specifically the IFRS 10 (2012) which requires that the parent (the investor) consolidates a subsidiary legal entity (the investee) when this is substantially controlled, even if the parent does not exert its power. The standard also outlines the requirements for the preparation and presentation of consolidated financial statements, stating that the financial statements of a group, including the assets, liabilities, equity, income, expenses and cash flows of the parent and its subsidiaries, must be presented as those of a single economic entity, without considering the borders of the legal entities.
The entity theory of consolidated financial statements confirms that to consider a business group as a single entity is recognising that the parent, although not owning 100% of the assets, has the effective control of the entire subsidiary (Moonitz, 1942) .
If a business group may be viewed as a single economic entity, we may expect that all the firms controlled and consolidated by the same parent company share the same ethical values and moral orientation.
An analogue concept, but from a different point of view, is expressed in the guidelines to the compilation of a social report issued by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2006) . The GRI requires that in setting the boundary for its report, an organisation must consider the range of entities over which it exercises control and over which it exercises influence.
Moreover, in recent years many companies have begun to integrate financial and non-financial performances in the same report -known as integrated reporting. This report consists of a holistic and integrated view of a company's financial position and results of operations, as well as in social and environmental terms (KPMG, 2008) .
The need to integrate financial and non-financial information has also been promoted by the European parliament (2003) through directive 2003/51/EC, better known as the accounts modernisation directive (AMD), issued in March 2003 and addressed to the corporate enterprises and banks as well as other financial institutions and insurance companies. The AMD has introduced new features regarding the content of annual reports, requiring that financial indicators and, if pertinent, non-financial indicators related to the specific activities of the firms, including environmental and social information, must be contained in the consolidated financial statements in order to guarantee the necessary understanding of the outlook and performances of the companies consolidated as a whole. In particular, the directive establishes that the information should not be restricted to the financial aspects of the company's business. It is expected that, where appropriate, this should lead to an analysis of the environmental and social aspects necessary for an understanding of the company's development, performance or position. This indicates a clear aim of the European legislature to go towards an integration of economic-financial disclosure and sustainability (Mio and Venturelli, 2013) .
As a result of the issues discussed, the objectives of CSR policies and disclosures of the subsidiaries operating in a business group should be consistent with those expressed by the holding company, especially when these operate in the same area and have strong business ties.
Institutional theory, isomorphic pressures and CSD
Social and environmental disclosure has been studied according to different theories (e.g., political economy, legitimacy, stakeholder, and institutional theory).
Regarding sustainability disclosure and motivations, legitimacy theory (Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995) is commonly considered the most influential framework within the domain of social and environmental accounting research (Deegan, 2000) . This theory focuses on whether the value system of an organisation is aligned with the value system of society, and whether the objective of organisations is to meet social expectations. In other words, this theory states that organisations continually seek to ensure that they operate within the bounds and norms of their respective societies (Deegan, 2000) . To obtain legitimacy, a status for which "a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions" [Suchman, (1995) , p.574], organisations attempt to establish congruence between the social values associated with or implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social system of which they are a part (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1972) .
From this perspective, as shown in Figure 1 , CSD is the means by which companies disclose information regarding the relationship with their physical and social environments (Guthrie and Parker, 1990 ) and the instrument used by companies to influence external perceptions about how they run their business and activities in order to gain social support (Deegan et al., 2002; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Woodward et al., 2001) .
However, although legitimacy theory contributes in understanding what motivates companies to provide CSD, it does not specify which actions should be taken or how the congruence can be obtained (Chen and Roberts, 2010) .
Among the theories, institutional theory (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) is also a theoretical framework adopted by scholars for social and accounting research. This theory is similar to legitimacy theory but focuses more strongly on the processes that allow organisations to obtain legitimacy. Differently from the prior theory that does not specifically explain how to reach the objective, institutional theory suggests that firms can incorporate institutionalised norms to obtain stability and improve their profitability and long survival (Chen and Roberts, 2010) .As suggested by Meyer and Rowan (1977) organisations strategically conform to a set of institutionalised beliefs, norms and rules in order to increase their legitimacy, resources and capabilities. In this sense, the process of legitimation to conform to a specific set of rules, called isomorphism, is the pathway to legitimacy (Chen and Roberts, 2010) . Di Maggio and Powell (1983, p.149 ) define isomorphism as a "constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions". The authors also identify three kinds of processes that are coercive, mimetic and normative. The driver of the first kind of isomorphism is to avoid sanctions from parties on which organisations are dependent (Greenwood et al., 2008) . The second happens when organisations embrace the system and rules of the existing institutions in their business. Finally normative is omorphism occurs when administrators intuitively follow conventional practices. Figure 1 depicts our theoretical framework. As stated by Lindblom (1994) much of the demand for CSD may be viewed as the result of public desire for information on which to base an opinion about whether or not a corporation is 'appropriate' or 'right and proper', i.e., to evaluate corporate legitimacy. Also, much of the voluntary social disclosure issued by corporations may be viewed as efforts at legitimation, as for example efforts to achieve the status of legitimacy. Souitaris et al. (2012) contribute to the field of institutional theory by identifying new forms of is omorphism with regard to corporate venture capital programmes. Those new forms, endoisomorphism and exoisomorphism, enable institutional theory to consider the behaviour of entities that operate in more than one environment.
The authors (2012) find that the focus of isomorphism specifies in which environment a unit becomes isomorphic. According to Souitaris et al. (2012) this could be either the internal corporate environment (in the case of endoisomorphism) or the external industry environment (in the case of exoisomorphism). More formally, they define endoisomorphism as alignment with parties located inside a focal organisation and exoisomorphism as alignment with parties located outside the focal organisation.
In particular, when a sub-unit seeks legitimacy with its parent demonstrates to be influenced by the coercive mechanism and endoisomorphism is more likely to be observed. In contrast, if the sub-unit prioritises legitimacy with its market and/or industry, exoisomorphism is present. In this case, a mimetic mechanism is the driver of isomorphism. This is also the case of companies affiliated in unrelated business groups where subsidiaries operate in different environments. The first one derives from their affiliation in a business group; the second is constituted by the industry/sector in which they run their activities. Furthermore, in an unrelated business group, the ties of a subsidiary to its parent should be reduced since there are possibilities to achieve economies of scope. In this case, the link with its task environment could be stronger than the one it has with the group.
From this point of view, institutional theory fits particularly well in our analysis, because of our interest in defining whether and how the affiliation of a listed subsidiary in a business group can influence its CSD. In this sense, institutional theory provides suggestions for explaining the practices of the CSD of business companies. If the controlled companies have been inculcated with the belief that CSD is required by the parent, it is possible that the pursuit of these social and environmental activities, and the related disclosure, represents a form of coercive isomorphism. Otherwise, if CSD is influenced by competitive requirements driven by the market and/or sector, it may be mimetic. The entity theory of the business group, as discussed in paragraph 2.1, and the focus of isomorphism are graphically represented by Figure 2 which illustrates the case of an unrelated business group in which a holding parent company controls three listed affiliated subsidiaries. Listed subsidiaries A and B operate in sectors different from that of the parent whereas listed subsidiary C carries out its business in the same sector as the listed parent company. Combining the arguments both from the theory on business groups and from institutional theory, we develop the following two propositions:
Proposition 1
If the subsidiary operates in the same industry/sector as the parent company, the CSD is similar to that of the parent, relying on an endoisomorphism pressure.
Proposition 2
If the subsidiary is affiliated in an unrelated group, the CSD is aligned with the industry/sector in which it operates, relying on an exoisomorphism pressure.
Methods
The theoretical debate on business groups and CSD led us to the formulation of two propositions. Propositions are important because each of them directs attention to something that should be examined within the scope of study (Yin, 2003) and will be used as a template for the multiple case studies discussion. The purpose of research through a case study is to develop theory, not to test it (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) and multiple-case studies typically provide a better base for theory building (Yin, 2003) .
In line with the case study methodology (Eisenhardt, 1989) , we examined separately each case study and then travelled back and forth between data to analyse them in a comparative manner. For each item we provide specific examples to support our findings and interpret each variable both in the context of academic literature and across the companies of our sample.
Sample selection
The sample includes all the Italian business groups in which at least two listed companies are present and one of them is controlled by a parent listed company. Our final sample consists of 13 listed holding companies (PC), 2 listed sub-holdings (SH), and 20 listed subsidiaries. We decided to analyse the Italian market since the ownership of Italian companies is characterised by the presence of pyramidal business groups (Aganin and Volpin, 2003) . In the pyramidal structures, the controlling shareholder generally controls the composition of the board of directors, influencing the corporation's activities (Zattoni, 1999) .In Italy there are also several listed companies that are controlled and consolidated by non-listed companies (Bianchi and Bianco, 2006; Di Carlo, 2014) . For instance, the listed companies Lottomatica and Dea capital are both controlled by De Agostini, but since that parent is non-listed, this group has been excluded from our sample. We decided to select only groups controlled by listed companies, excluding business groups in which the holding is not listed, because, all things being equal, larger firms have greater CSR engagement and are more likely to disclose CSR practices since they pay more attention to their relationships with external stakeholders (Campbell, 2007; Du and Vieira, 2012; Gray et al., 1995; KPMG, 2008; Waddock and Graves, 1997) . Moreover, part of our research aims to identify similarities and differences in terms of CSD within the business groups. Thus, the fact that all the companies of our sample are listed provides us with the appropriate context in which to investigate our research questions. Furthermore, the selected business groups have different sizes, types of ownership, and operate in different industries and sectors. Thus, as suggested by scholars, the case selection is not based on the similarity of the cases but rather on the basis of their dissimilarity (Peters, 1998) . Finally, our sample size (i.e. 13 cases) is considered appropriate for case study analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989) .
We selected the Italian market because, starting from 2008, Italian listed companies have incorporated social and environmental disclosure in their annual reports, according to the modernisation directive (AMD), issued by the European parliament and applied into the Italian legal system through legislative decree no. 32/2007. Table 1 provides keys statistics about the selected companies, including market capitalisation, total assets, number of employees and sales revenue turnover. All these companies are listed on the Italian stock exchange (Borsa Italiana). The analysis follows three main directions:
1 business group profile 2 ownership structure 3 CSD.
Financial data have been collected from Bloomberg and Borsa Italiana, all for December 2013. As the analysed companies are listed, they all adopt the IAS/IFRS standards. Data about ownership composition have been gathered from the Consob (Commissione Nazionale per la Società e la Borsa) website. We collected CSD information by visiting companies' corporate websites multiple times from the beginning of 2013.
Business group profile
This part focuses on the listed, selected groups, showing their primary industry and sector (Table 2) . Identifying the industrial sector is important in order to assess if the CSD of the subsidiaries is influenced by their industry according to our second proposition. In our analysis, the parent controlling company (PC) is highlighted by a shaded row for each group considered, whereas the sub-holding companies have been labelled with the acronym (SH). There are two cases in which a second level of sub-holding is present, that are respectively: Table 2 Industry/sector and relations among companies (4) Exor ( Table 2 Industry/sector and relations among companies (continued) (4) Monrif ( With regard to the industry, Table 2 shows that in most of our cases, listed subsidiaries operate in the same primary industry of the parent company (column 4).
In Exor group all the listed subsidiaries operate in sectors that are different from that of the parent.
In the Caltagirone group, among five listed companies, the only one that does not share the same primary industry is Caltagirone Editore, since it operates in the media sector, while all the others are industrial companies operating in building materials or construction and materials.
In the Cofide group, only Cofide and its sub-holding CIR share the same industry and sector; all the other companies operate in unrelated businesses.
Immsi isa holding company that operates in the real estate, industrial and naval sectors, whereas Piaggio is a leader in manufacturing two-wheeled motor vehicles.
Italmobiliare is a holding company listed on the Milan Stock Exchange, whose majority ownership is controlled by the Pesenti family. Italmobiliare holds investments in companies active in a variety of sectors. Its controlled listed company, Italcementi, is the world's fifth largest cement producer.
Thus, the unrelated business groups are respectively the following five: Exor, Caltagirone, Cofide, Piaggio and Italmobiliare. The rest of our sample (eight groups) is composed of groups in which the subsidiaries rely on their business from the same industry as the parent.
Ownership structure
With regard to the ownership structure, we indicate several variables. As shown in Table 3 , families control the majority of these groups (seven groups), compared to those groups controlled by the State (three groups) and coalitions of investors (two groups). Finally, a widely held corporation controls the Premafin group. The phenomenon of listed groups (i.e., the presence of more than one listed company controlled by the same major shareholder) is more frequent for family groups.
Caltagirone is the group with the more concentrated ownership and also the group with the lowest presence of relevant minority shareholders (i.e., those with more than 2%, according to Consob regulation).
De Benedetti has the longest control chain. Indeed, between the ultimate owner (i.e. De Benedetti) and the company at the bottom of the group (e.g., non-listed companies controlled by Sogefi and L'Espresso) there are three levels of listed companies.
Three groups (Finmeccanica, Eni and Enel) are de facto controlled by the State, showing an elevated percentage in the hands of the minority shareholders. 
Corporate social disclosure (CSD)
In order to explore CSD, we used the content analysis methodology (Krippendorff, 1980) . As stated by Abbott and Monsen (1979) content analysis is a data-gathering technique consisting of codifying qualitative information in anecdotal and literary form into categories in order to derive quantitative scales of varying levels of complexity. The process started with the construction of a list of several content categories determined first to be in line with previous academic literature. The analysis also integrates the Global Reporting Initiative (2011) approach. Consistent with a large body of prior research (Bravo et al., 2012; Du and Vieira, 2012; Holder-Webb et al., 2008; Maignan and Ralston, 2002; Moreno and Capriotti, 2009; Patten, 2002; Wanderley et al., 2008) , we use information provided by companies on their corporate websites as our data source. Indeed, the internet has become one of the major tools for providing CSD, since it allows companies to disclose their information faster and less expensively than in the past (Bravo et al., 2012; Wanderley et al., 2008) . In particular, we analysed all the information provided on corporate websites and included in the main documents. Our analysis covers different channels and documents available on the websites, especially annual reports, codes of ethics, and sustainability reports. As indicated by Bravo et al. (2012) the consideration of all those kinds of information allows the researcher to address the limitation of previous studies that focused exclusively on the analysis of CSR reports without considering additional materials or links containing such kinds of information.
The final list of variables explored, as shown in Table 4 , is intended as a compromise between the aim to capture all the CSD features and the need to condense our analysis. Table 4 provides the list of items to conduct our analysis, their description and the list of corresponding references. Table 4 Disclosure index
Variable Description Reference

Corporate mission and values
Embedding CSR in corporate mission and values. Maignan and Ralston (2002), Wanderley et. al (2008) , GRI (2011), Bravo et al. (2012) and Du and Vieira (2012) CSR on the homepage CSR or similar issues (e.g., sustainable development or environmental responsibility) on the homepage of the corporate website.
Wanderley et al. (2008)
Accessibility Accessibility of CSR related information on corporate website (e.g., separated sustainability section on the main page, separated and listed tabs, reports available for downloading). Wanderley et al. (2008) and Du and Vieira (2012) Awards/certificates Awards and/or certificates that the company has won in relation to sustainability.
Du and Vieira (2012)
Source: Our elaboration
The resulting framework includes variables (i.e. 'availability of code of ethics'; 'accessibility') coded by using a dichotomous procedure (1 if present; 0 otherwise) and variables (i.e. 'economic dimension'; 'CSR project results') coded for their intensity using a seven-point Likert scale (i.e., 0 = no mention of variable; 1 = variable considered but only in reference to another document; 2 = brief mention with little or no detail; 3 = discussion of variable with some but not extensive detail; 4 = detailed discussion of variable; 5 = discussion of variable comprises over 30% of the document text; and 6 = document completely dedicated to the variable). Unlike the large body of literature (Barako and Brown, 2008; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012 ) that considers simply the extent of disclosure by counting the frequency of page or simple word, we provide a more sensitive analysis not only evaluating if a company discloses an item but also measuring the intensity given to such an item (Holder-Webb et al., 2008) . Our approach to scoring items has the advantage of overcoming the main limitation of the dichotomous procedure that considers the disclosure of one sentence as well as the presence of a document completely dedicated to the variable (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) . At the same time, assigning intensity to a particular content category gives coders more choice, thus being less reliable (Krippendorff, 1980) . To avoid judgmental bias, two authors built the content categories and defined the list of items. After training provided to two assistants, a check was performed on a sample of 40 companies in order to achieve a common understanding and discuss any possible judgments or disagreements. Weekly meetings were also fixed to discuss the relevant incidents and to resolve researchers' dilemmas. At the end of assistants' codification, the authors audited independently the scores assigned. Due to the large amount of information, data analysis has been conducted by visiting companies' corporate websites multiple times from the beginning of 2013. The index was constructed using a dichotomous procedure for dummy variables in which an item scores one if present and zero otherwise. For variables measured with the Likert scale, we considered the score obtained.
The corporate social disclosure index (CSDI) is measured for each company as the ratio of the score obtained to the maximum possible score relevant for that company.
In order to assess the internal consistency of our disclosure index, we used the Cronbach's coefficient alpha. The coefficient alpha for the content categories is 0.86 whereas the coefficient alpha based on standardised data is 0.88. This evidence suggests that the content categories considered in our analysis capture the same underlying construct, indicating the internal consistency in the coding procedure (Krippendorff, 1980) .
Findings and discussion
In the Section 2, the theoretical background on business groups, institutional theory and CSD led us to the formulation of two propositions that will be used below as a template for the discussion of our findings.
The first research question asks if the affiliation to a business group may affect the CSD of subsidiaries. In particular, in proposition 1, we suggest that in a business group the CSD of the subsidiaries is similar to that of the parent company if they operate in the same industry (Refer to Figure 2) .
In order to investigate the phenomenon under consideration, we performed a content analysis of the corporate websites and the main documents available to find out if the subsidiaries share the same CSD as their parent, relying on endoisomorphism pressure when they operate in the same industry.
To measure the differences quantitatively, we constructed an index (CSDI) able to capture and synthetise the quality and the extent of CSD. This index is the tool we used to find the differences and similarities among the levels of disclosure of listed firms affiliated to the same business group. Since the fact that the index calculated ranges from 0 to 100, we consider significant only those variations in the level of disclosure that differ by at least 15 points. Table 5 provides the list of the scores obtained by each company in terms of CSD (column 5), while column 4 shows if the analysed company operates in the same industry/sector as the parent. To present and better discuss our findings, a matrix was built. The horizontal axis presents the industry and the vertical axis the level of CSD. In particular, on the horizontal axis we divided the affiliated listed subsidiaries into two groups: those that operate and those that do not operate in the same business as the parent company. The CSD of the subsidiary is considered to be similar to that of the parent if the score calculated through the CSDI is within the relevant range of 15 points. On the other hand, the CSD is considered not to be similar if the score obtained by the subsidiary differs by more than 15 points from that of its parent. Thus, as shown in Figure 3 , companies that are placed in quadrants I and IV are more oriented to seek legitimacy from the parent focusing on endoisomorphism, whereas companies that are positioned in quadrants II and III are more concerned with gaining legitimacy externally within the industry. From the analysis given in Figure 3 it emerges that 93% of listed subsidiaries operating in the same industry of the parent adopt the same CSD (so they are positioned in quadrant I of our matrix), relying on endoisomorphism pressure. The only case in which the level of CSD is not similar to that of the parentis the case of Cementir. However, it should be noted that even if the subsidiary (Cementir) and its parent company (Caltagirone) belong to the same industry, the sectors among them are very different. In fact, while the holding company works in the construction and material sector, Cementir is active in manufacturing and distributing white and grey cement (building and material sector). Moreover, in the annual report Cementir claims not to be directed or coordinated by its parent, as it decides on its general and operating strategies independently, despite the holding being 69,2% of its shares.
We believe that the CSD of Cementir is affected by an exoisomorphism pressure, being more similar to that of Italcementi than that of its parent. In fact, these two companies are strongly influenced by the sector in which they operate, as supported by their declarations on corporate websites or by their affiliation to industry's association.
For example, Italcementi declares on its website:
"As a member of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) Italcementi Group has signed the Cement Sustainability Initiative's Agenda for Action, the first formal commitment that binds a number of world cement industry leaders".
[online] http://www.italcementigroup.com/ENG/Italcementi+Group/ On the same line, Cementirstates:
"Furthermore, Cementir Holding's operating companies are members of major cement manufacturer associations that host work groups and committees actively committed to sustainability issues".
Cementir environmental report, p.51
Moreover, in the environmental report, the chairman of the board of directors of Cementir declares:
"The relationship with the territory is one of the crucial aspects of our work, because our business has an inevitable impact on the areas where we are located. And that's why we, at Cementir, pay particular attention to issues related to climate change and to emissions into the atmosphere".
Cementir environmental report, p.7
Based on our CSDI and according to the legitimacy theory, in sectors particularly susceptible to public opinion (as in the cement production sector) companies seek to gain legitimacy from their industry by adopting a mimetic isomorphism. Specifically, exoisomorphism is more likely to be observed when a subsidiary prioritises legitimacy within its industry, by following the industry's norms and practices. We believe that this is the case with Cementir which is the only company affiliated to the Caltagirone group producing an environmental report. The other companies affiliated to the same group (Vianini Industria and Vianini Lavori) are positioned in quadrant I, since they show the same CSDI as the controlling company. With regard to the Finmeccanica group, we can observe that the controlling parent (Finmeccanica) states in its code of ethics (section 'application within the group'): The same principle was also expressed within the previous version of the code, in the following way: "This code expresses the guiding principles that have been followed by the societies affiliated to the group. Therefore, Finmeccanica, in exercising its direction and coordination activity, provides the diffusion of Code of Ethics to the controlled societies, so that they formally adopt it as a management tool and effective element of strategy, after having adapted or modified it. As a result of this diffusion, the ethical principles set out in this Code of Ethics are the property of all subsidiaries […] . In addition, Finmeccanica requires all subsidiaries to behave in line with the principles set out in this Code of Ethics." From this perspective, in exercising its operations, Ansaldo must comply with the ethical values and behavioural rules defined by the parent.
Regarding the group composed of ASTM and Sias, it is important to underline that these companies not only share the same level of CSD (so Sias is positioned within quadrant I of the matrix) but also the corporate website. In fact, on the website of ASTM is presented a tab entitled 'links to associated companies' leading to the Sias website. The websites' structures, pages and contents are identical. In this case and according to our first proposition, a strong form of endoisomorphism pressure emerges due to the fact that the subsidiary and the parent operate in the same sector. This is also the case with Poligrafici Editoriale. The subsidiary adopts the same code of ethics as its parent and it does not have its own website, but shares that of the parent. In fact, the financial information of the company is presented as a sub-section of the controlling parent's website. It is clear that in all these cases the subsidiaries cannot be studied as independent entities regarding sustainability, instead the analysis should be considered for the whole group as a single economic entity.
The second research question asks how much of the CSD depends on the affiliation in a business group or whether it is influenced, according to the legitimacy theory, by the specific sector in which the firm operates. Thus, in proposition 2 we state that in unrelated business groups, the CSD is aligned with the industry in which the listed subsidiary operates.
From the analysis of the industry, it emerges that the unrelated business groups are respectively the following: Exor, Caltagirone, Cofide, Piaggio and Italmobiliare.
Exor is the pure listed holding of the Agnelli group and is one of Europe's leading investment companies that makes long-term investments in diversified sectors, mainly in Europe, the US and in the major emerging markets. Exor directly controls three listed companies: Fiat, CNH and Juventus. Fiat is an international automotive group that designs, produces and sells vehicles for the mass market under the Fiat, Alfa Romeo, Lancia, Abarth and Fiat Professional brands, as well as luxury and performance cars under the Ferrari and Maserati brands. Fiat Group also operates in the components sector, through Magneti Marelli and Teksid, and in the production systems sector, through Comau. CNH Industrial is a company created from the merger of Fiat Industrial and CNH Global and is a global leader in capital goods, uniting CNH's agricultural and construction equipment operations with Iveco trucks, commercial and specialty vehicles and FPT Industrial's broad portfolio of power train applications. Juventus operates in the field of professional football activity.
In the Agnelli group, according to our second proposition, all the affiliated subsidiaries obtain a different CSDI with respect to that of the parent. Thus, all the affiliated listed subsidiaries adapt the CSD to the specific characteristics of their industry. However, we found that the CSDI of Fiat and that of CNH are quite similar. This is also confirmed by the fact that the missions expressed within their codes of ethics are identical. It should be explained that even if the sectors in which the companies operate are different, the fact is that there are strong connections between them.
Also, all the listed companies declare to be not subjected to direction activity from Exor. The absence of direction activity and the differences in terms of CSDI allow us to say that Agnelli group's companies focus more on exoisomorphism, confirming our second proposition.
The group controlled by the De Benedetti family has a pyramidal structure and operates in unrelated sectors. Cofide is the pure listed holding of De Benedetti group. CIR is a Cofide investment subsidiary. It is active in the energy sector, media, automotive components, healthcare and financial investments. Sogefi is a CIR subsidiary and is one of the major international groups operating worldwide in the sector of automotive components. Gruppo Editoriale L'Espresso is also a CIR subsidiary and is one of the leading media groups in Italy with interests in publishing, radio, advertising, internet businesses and television. The consolidated of Cofide group combines financial statements of listed sub-holdings C.I.R., Sogefi, L'Espresso and all their subsidiaries, while that of CIR combines Sogefi and L'Espresso.
The companies affiliated to the De Benedetti group obtained an equal CSDI and they all adopt the same code of ethics (that diverges even to the type of font used), although they operate in different sectors. It seems that the controlled companies have just applied the ethical directives of the parent without considering the characteristics of what they do. In this vein, it should be noted that all De Benedetti's subsidiaries (Cofide, Cir, Sogefi and L'Espresso) declare to be directed by their controlling company, following the Italian business group regulation (Article 2497-bis of the Italian Civil Code) even though they operate in different industries.
The Colaninno family controls two listed companies: Immsi and Piaggio, owning respectively 42% and 22.5% of their cash flow rights. Immsi and Piaggio obtained a different CSDI but the controlling company declares:
"IMMSI submits its Code of Conduct to all the subsidiaries so they, after having adapted it to the needs and situations, formally adopt it as a management tool and as an effective organization instrument. In addition, the Company requires and expects that all the companies act in accordance with the principles of this Code".
Immsi Code of Ethics approved on 2008, p.8.
Therefore when companies operate in a different sector or industry, exoisomorphism pressure seems to explain different extents of CSD, with the exception of those companies that are directed and coordinated by the holding company.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to examine if affiliation to a business group may influence the CSD or if in a business group the CSD can be explained by the industry/sector in which the controlled companies operate. In order to answer our research questions, we used a theoretical framework merging two streams of research: the literature on business groups and that on institutional theory and CSD. We then formulated two propositions discussed through a multiple case study analysis on 13 business groups within which operate 35 listed companies. The main objective of this work is to underline why it should be important to analyse the disclosure of listed subsidiaries in the field of CSR considering that they are part of a wider business group.
Our exploratory study provides several contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the only study that considers the ties of entities affiliated to a business group by analysing their impacts on CSD. We found that in business groups, CSD is strongly affected by the presence of a controlling company. In particular, affiliated subsidiaries that operate in the same sector as their parent company adopt the same CSD, relying on an endoisomorphism pressure. The evidence that controlled companies seem only to apply, within their organisation, the ethical guidelines of their parent, suggests that business groups should be considered as a single economic entity, not only in terms of financial performance but also in terms of sustainable actions and disclosure. This seems to be true even in those cases in which the affiliated companies operate in different sectors, especially when subsidiaries are directed and coordinated by their holding.
In this sense this study may be helpful for scholars who are willing to study in depth the link between ownership and CSD, highlighting the need to better analyse the ties among companies in order to avoid the duplication of results. Additionally, the extent of CSD can be meant as a further proxy for measuring the degree of independence of listed companies affiliated to business groups.
In this line, further researches should investigate how much the direction and coordination activity of the parent influences the sustainability disclosure of the whole group, by considering that as a proxy to measure the independence of controlled entities. In this context, interlocking directorships among affiliated companies could play a significant role. Indeed, in a business group, the presence of the same directors in the affiliated-group companies could be considered as a type of non-ownership control that reinforces the equity ties of the holding company since through intra-group interlocks the parent company can manage and coordinate the affiliated companies as a single economic entity.
The main limitation of this work derives from the tool used to investigate the phenomenon. In fact, we collected secondary data and measured the disclosure and not the real engagement.
Also, even if the study had been focused on more firms, there is the risk that the results would have been closely idiosyncratic to particular cases, because the case study is a research strategy, which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings (Eisenhardt, 1989) . The need for an econometric verification through a larger sample to extend the results is, therefore, strong. Thus the multiple case studies should be followed by an econometric verification, so as to ensure the generalisability of the results, notwithstanding that they may be valid only within the Italian context, given its special features, such as for example, the high level of private benefits of control and the specific business group law.
